Every assertion below is bound to registered sources and carries its own confidence. Weight them; do not treat the page as uniformly authoritative.
The question is put in the author's own words and it is put at its widest. At §13 of libro III, capítulo XXIX of the Política Indiana "Pero aora se ofrece una question, que la tengo por grave, y es, si podrá el Principe, aunque no intervenga delito del Feudatario, ò Encomendero, privarle del Feudo, ò Encomienda? ò en general, con causa, ò sin ella por sola su voluntad extinguir, revocar, y quitar todas las Encomiendas, que tiene concedidas, y las están posseyendo personas particulares, y volverlas à incorporar en su Corona Real?" This entry is scoped to §§13-37, the whole of that question; the modes of extinction at §§1-12 and the procedural and restitution questions at §§38-51 are separate entries.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The affirmative case is built first, and its opening argument is the one the crown's own officials used. At §14, for the affirmative part, it seems it could be said to be lawful to him, "supuesto, que como su nombre lo dice, y en otros Capitulos lo déxo apuntado, siempre se dan, y han dado como en deposito, ò precario, y amoviles ad nutum del concedente: lo qual, quando interviene, es permitida en Derecho la revocacion voluntaria", which Baldo taught pointedly of feudos, followed by Alexandro, Jasón and many others.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
A Castilian text is added to the affirmative case and applied to the Indies by name. At §15 "A los quales añado Yo un texto célebre con su glossa en nuestras Partidas, donde expressamente está decidido, que los Feudos, que llaman de Camara, que son los que se pagan de bolsa, y hacienda Real, quales parecen ser estas Encomiendas, se pueden quitar siempre que el Rey quisiere, el qual texto aplica à ellas individualmente Juan Matienzo, teniendolas por Feudos Camerales."
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The circumstances of the encomienda's creation are turned into an argument for its fragility, with a classical tag. At §16 there is also the consideration that they were introduced in time of war, and to quell "los tumultos, y sediciones, que se comenzaron à sentir, è intentar en algunas Provincias de las Indias: caso en que, como prudentemente lo dice Seneca, suelen conceder los Reyes muchas cosas à cierra ojos: y assi son mas faciles de revocar", following Felino's doctrine, and specified by writers of the author's own kingdom for the grants made in Portugal and in Castile by Don Juan I and Don Enrique II and IV.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The affirmative case then reaches the doctrine of absolute power, and states it without softening. At §17, although in feudos and encomiendas there is a certain correspectivity between what is given and what is received, so that they seem obligatory on both sides, still it cannot be denied "que preponderà en ellas la gracia, y beneficio à sus cargas, y obligaciones"; and whenever this intervenes it is likewise the common opinion of the doctors "que puede el Principe sin causa, de plenitudine potestatis, y con causa de Derecho, y potestad ordinaria quitar los Feudos, y demás Mercedes, y Beneficios assi concedidos, y aunque sean remuneratorios, si le llegan à ser de grave perjuicio."
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The third argument for the affirmative says what, on this view, the encomienda rested on, and the answer is nothing but the royal will. At §18 "Lo tercero, porque en instituir, formar, y conceder estas Encomiendas, no huvo mas ley, que la voluntad de nuestros Reyes, assistida de las conveniencias, y justas consideraciones, que los tiempos fueron trayendo consigo"; which supposed, there seems to be nothing that could prevent extinguishing them, resolving them, taking them away in common or in particular, or giving them the good form the kings think fit, "siendo, como es cierto, y llano, que en las cosas, que son, y penden de Derecho meramente positivo, puede el Principe Supremo hacer qualquier reformacion general, y que esta se debe observar, aunque sea contra leyes, y estatutos anteriores, en que tengan ordenado lo contrario", per Bartolo, commonly followed by the legists, and Paulo de Castro, Jasón and Alexandro, who add that such reformations are valid even without the solemnity that making or unmaking new laws requires. At §§19-20 the canonists are brought in on the same side: the pope may derogate positive law even without cause, and may deprive any cleric of his benefice by ordinary power, "porque no se halla su potestad en quanto à esto coartada por reglas algunas, y todos los Beneficios en quanto à esto se tienen por manuales, ò amovibles ad nutum." At §21 many authors are cited for the proposition that princes may take away rights acquired by private persons, concluding "que mas facilmente les pueden quitar aquellas cosas, que ellos les concedieron, que las que los mismos Vassallos huvieren adquirido por su industria, y trabajo."
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
Having made that case the author rejects it, and the sentence in which he turns is the hinge of the chapter. At §22 "Pero aunque lo que assi he dicho, y considerado por esta parte pueda tener, y hacer alguna fuerza en rigor de disputa, sin embargo tengo por mas cierta, y segura en ambos Fueros la contraria: conviene à saber, que mirando el estado, que tienen de presente estas Encomiendas, y que están ya hechas como hacienda, y patrimonio propio de los Encomenderos por el tiempo de las dos vidas, porque se les han concedido, y que se las han dado en premio de remuneracion de los servicios, que han hecho, y de los que en adelante deben hacer por razon, y obligacion de ellas, no pueden, ni deben nuestros Catholicos Reyes, mediante justicia, quitarselas, ni revocarselas en todo, ni en parte, ni reformarlas en perjuicio suyo sin gravissimas, y legitimas causas, que à ello obliguen." The claim is not that the king lacks the power but that he may not lawfully use it, and the standard is set as "mediante justicia".
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The first ground is a Castilian statute, and the doctrine attached to it is a statement about sin rather than about administration. At §23 the first is the celebrated doctrine of Angelo, reported and followed by Felino, "que enseña, que peca mortalmente el Principe, que sin culpa, ò causa revoca las gracias, y mercedes, ya una vez hechas à sus Vassallos, la qual se comprueba por una ley nuestra recopilada, que expressamente decide, que las cosas, que el Rey diere à alguno, no se las puedan quitar èl, ni otro alguno sin culpa, &c." On that authority Matienzo says the same is to be understood and practised in these encomiendas, and that they are as feudos rectos.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The Partidas text cited on the other side is then answered, and the answer turns on identifying which American grants were the revocable ones. At §23 the ley de Partida disposing "que los de la Camara son revocables" is to be understood of the pensions or entretenimientos that the royal liberality used to make to the sons and descendants of the ancient conquistadores and pobladores of the Nuevo Orbe, mentioned in leyes 22 and 30 of those called Nuevas promulgated for the government of the Indies in 1542. At §24 the author declines even that much: "Aunque Yo no me conformé con esto en otro Capitulo de este Libro, en que traté de las Pensiones. Porque tengo para mi, que Camara Real, es lo mismo que Fisco, como lo dan à entender algunas leyes del Reyno, y por ellas Hugo de Celso. Y las dichas Pensiones no se pagan de la hacienda, y renta Fiscal; sino de tributos de Indios destinados para esto, ò de la Caxa Real, por donde no pueden, si no me engaño, llamarse Feudos de Camara." At §25 he adds that even if they did resemble them, since they are given as encomiendas and in place of them and to remunerate the merits and services of the conquistadores and pobladores or their descendants, "igual razon corre, para que sean tan durables, è irrevocables como ellas", and so it is disposed in the common law and by the municipal law of the Indies in the declaratory laws published at Valladolid in 1543 to reform those called Nuevas of the preceding year, as Antonio de León says well.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
Three writers are named as going further than the author does, and one of them was a serving American bishop. At §26 "Y antes de él Antonio de Herrera, y Fr. Juan Zapata, y novissimamente D. Fr. Gaspar de Villarroel, meritissimo Obispo de Santiago de Chile, los quales refieren las causas, que obligaron à hacer estas gratificaciones, y están tan lexos de sentir, que puedan, ni deban ser revocables, ò quitarse sin culpa, à los que las gozan, y à sus successores, que antes son de parecer, que se les debian de hacer de nuevo otras mucho mayores honras, y mercedes." The position reported is that of men who wanted the encomenderos rewarded more, and it is reported as such rather than adopted.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The argument from wartime grants is answered by a doctrine about conquest, and this is the passage in which the chapter is most plainly the encomenderos' case. At §27 the contrary doctrine, that grants made in time of war are not stable, "no se entiende, con los que con su sangre, sudor, trabajo, y hacienda sirvieron bien, y fielmente en ellas, y mediante esto ganaron para su Rey nuevos Reynos, y Provincias, como lo hicieron los Conquistadores de ellas"; in such a case the other doctrine applies, "la qual enseña, que en las Tierras assi de nuevo adquiridas, pueden, y deben ser los Reyes mucho mas francos, y liberales, repartiendo lo bueno de ellas entre los que se las ayudaron à ganar, y poblar", of which Burgos de Paz wrote learnedly and at length in one of his consejos, "y aun mejor, y mas en nuestros terminos Adan Contzen en los doctos libros de su Politica." The costs of that repartimiento to the people among whom it was made are not weighed on this page and this entry does not take the passage for a judgment about them.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
A further analogy turns the grant into something closer to a bargain than a gift, and it is drawn from the settlement of towns. At §28 "Y à esta doctrina podemos añadir otra de Abad, y los que le siguen, que no hace menos à nuestro intento: conviene à saber, que si un Principe concede à algun Pueblo franqueza, y exempcion de tributos, y gabelas, por remunerar servicios, que de él ha recibido, y para que mediante esta immunidad se pueble, acreciente, y conserve mejor, (que es lo que vemos ha sucedido en estas Colonias de las Indias, mediante las Encomiendas) no debe semejante exempcion revocarse, ni alterarse facilmente por el Principe: porque assimila mas à Contrato, que à Donacion, pues en finca de ella tuvo efecto la poblacion, ò creció, y se aumentó en vecinos, y comerciantes."
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The feudal and contractual grounds are stated next, and both of them carry a condition of compensation. At §29, if encomiendas are regulated by feudos, the commoner and truer opinion is that although conceded by mere grace, once conceded "no los puede quitar à sus Vassallos el Señor, que se los concedió de potestad ordinaria sin grave culpa suya, ù otra urgente causa, que concierna en publica utilidad: y aun en este caso, dando suficiente cambio, y satisfaccion à los despojados", the reason given being that these concessions and feudal customs bind them, "y que es mas poderoso el Derecho Natural, que el del Principado, y que, ni aun de poder absoluto les pueden quitar, ni alterar en cosa de perjuicio considerable la forma de su investidura, y de su succession, si se concedieron por via de contrato." At §30, if they are instead regulated by the rules of contracts, donations or privileges of princes, the truer and commoner opinion is that these cannot be revoked or modified by the prince who granted them nor by his successor, "sino es que intervenga grave culpa del Donatario, ú otra justa causa, y entonces está obligado à compensar en otras cosas, lo que quitare. Y aun muchos afirman, que sola la causa de la ingratitud no es suficiente para esto."
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The argument's rhetorical peak is a sentence about what revocation costs a ruler. At §31 "Y Belluga añade, que esto todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio: y todos, que quando el Principe hace algo en contrario de ello, se presume ser engañado: porque no ay cosa, que mas desdiga de su grandeza, y autoridad, que revocar lo ya concedido, ò faltar à la constancia, y estabilidad de sus dadivas, ò promessas: pues antes debe aumentar semejantes mercedes, que quitarlas, ò minorarlas." At §32 the same is said to be the better opinion even of the pope in the revocation of ecclesiastical benefices, gathered from infinite authors by Cenedo and others, among them García and Magero, who hold that in the case where the pope could with just cause take a benefice from a man who held it, he would have to provide him another as good or better.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The chapter then defines the just cause it has been requiring, and the definition excludes the prince's own advantage. At §33 "Y esta justa causa, de que havemos hecho tan repetida mencion, para las dichas revocaciones, no se ha de medir mirando, y atendiendo à sola la utilidad, y comodidad del Principe, como lo advierten bien los AA. citados; sino à la publica, y urgente necessidad del Reyno, que pida semejante mudanza, cuya salud preponderà à la de los Particulares." At §34 a case is conceded in which an encomienda could be taken from one to give to another who was very deserving and had just performed some notable service, "porque se entiende, que esto redunda tambien en publica utilidad"; but then, as the authors say, "se ha de dar buen cambio al posseedor: porque de otra suerte, como lo dice Baldo, y otros, que le refieren, fuera diabolica potestad, y no bien governada necessidad."
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
The closing paragraphs are addressed to the crown's own lawyers and to the crown's own continuity. At §35, this justification and compensation ceasing, "siempre es lo mas seguro, y decente en los Principes, y en los de sus Consejeros", and, as the text runs on to §36, "no quitar, ni alterar lo ya concedido, pues contradice esto à su principal atributo, que es ser liberales, y graciosos: como lo dicen Baldo, Matheo de Afflictis, y Pedro Petra, reprobando, y reprehendiendo à los Abogados Fiscales, que aconsejan, ò defienden lo contrario." At §36 the same is owed not only to their own grants but to those of their predecessors, "pues aunque se mude la persona, no se muda la dignidad, que es una cosa intelectual, que enigmaticamente persevera, y organiza qualquier cuerpo, en quien passa, y à quien anima", as Baldo said magisterially and philosophically, "y que no se debe tener por zelador; sino por destruidor de su Corona, el que deshace, ò quita, lo que hicieron, ò concedieron sus antecessores, y puede temer, que harán con él lo mismo, los que le succedieren." At §37 the opinion of Matheo de Afflictis, that a king succeeding in a kingdom is not obliged to remunerate services done to his predecessors, is rejected as ill founded.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
One passage in this range is the 1736 editor's and not the author's. An asterisked paragraph after §23 notes that in the recopiled laws mention is made of these entretenimientos and pensiones, citing "L. 30. y sig. tit. 8. y l. 18. y 19. tit. 11. lib. 6. Recop. Y en el num. 47. del Cap. XXVIII. antecedente." Per the convention this corpus settled for this impression the asterisked paragraphs are the work of the 1736 editor and must not be attributed to Solórzano or dated to his century; none of the leyes cited was opened in any printing of the Recopilación, and this claim carries a lower confidence for that reason.
confidence 0.8Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary
What this entry establishes and what it does not. It establishes that the standard seventeenth-century treatise on the government of the Spanish Indies put the question whether the king might revoke all the encomiendas at will, set out eight arguments that he might, and then argued for fifteen paragraphs that he might not do so lawfully without grave and legitimate cause; that the reasons given were the recopiled law that what the king gives may not be taken without fault, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility with compensation, the contractual analogy of a town's exemption bought by settlement, and the doctrine that a dignity does not change with the person of its holder; and that the just cause was defined as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom rather than the convenience of the prince. It establishes nothing about what the crown in fact did. Not one cédula of revocation, not one case and not one date of decision appears in these paragraphs; the chapter is an argument and the argument is the author's own, written by a man who sat on the Council of the Indies and who argues here against that Council's fiscal lawyers by name. It establishes nothing about the Indians of the encomiendas in question: the whole argument is about the rights of grantees against the crown, the people encomendados are not parties to it on these pages, and the one place where their interest might have told — a revocation for the public good — is weighed as the kingdom's necessity and not as theirs. Read beside the same chapter's earlier paragraphs, and beside the crown's own reasoning printed in the previous chapter, where the encomienda is called a gratuitous donation that may be charged at will, it is also evidence of an unsettled question rather than of settled law.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§13-37 — whether the prince may extinguish, revoke and take back all the encomiendas he has granted, in common or in particular, with cause or without it, and incorporate them in his Crown: the question stated at §13, the eight arguments for the affirmative at §§14-21 (the grant as a deposit or precario amovible ad nutum, the Partidas text on the feudos de Cámara applied to the encomiendas by Matienzo as feudos camerales, their introduction in time of war and Seneca on what kings concede with their eyes shut, the plenitude of power, the will of the kings as the only law that instituted them, the pope's power to derogate positive law, the canonists on benefices held ad nutum, and the doctrine that princes may resume what they themselves conceded), and the author's contrary conclusion at §§22-37 with its seven grounds — the recopilada law that what the king gives to any man may not be taken from him without fault, the answer that the revocable feudos de Cámara are the pensions and not the encomiendas, Herrera, Zapata and Bishop Villarroel, Burgos de Paz and Contzen on newly acquired lands, the Abad on a town's exemption bought by settlement, the feudal rule requiring grave fault or urgent public utility and compensation, Belluga's 'todo el mundo lo tiene por Evangelio', the measure of just cause as the public and urgent necessity of the kingdom and not the prince's convenience, Baldo on a taking without exchange as diabolical power, and the dignity that does not change with the person · primary