Every assertion below is bound to registered sources and carries its own confidence. Weight them; do not treat the page as uniformly authoritative.
The chapter's procedural rule is stated as a consequence of its argument about revocation, and it binds the viceroys expressly. At §38 of libro III, capítulo XXIX of the Política Indiana "Y de estos mismos principios desciende, que quando se tratare de querer privar à algun Encomendero de su Encomienda con pretexto de alguna causa, y culpa, que se le impute, se ha de probar esto primero bastante, y legitimamente, y no podrá el Principe, y mucho menos sus Virreyes, y Lugar-Tenientes proceder à privarle, ni à dar su Encomienda à otro tercero sin citarle, y oirle, convencerle, y condenarle por los terminos judiciales. Porque esto es lo regular en Derecho, que no se dén à otros los bienes, del que se dice ser delinquente, sin preceder sentencia condenatoria, que aya passado en cosa juzgada: y Rebufo añade, que las donaciones hechas en otra forma, aunque sean de Reyes supremos, son de ningun momento." This entry is scoped to §§38-51, the close of the chapter; §§13-37 on revocation and §§1-12 on the modes of extinction are separate entries.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
The rule is then stated at its widest, against kings and popes alike. At §39 "Y lo mismo enseñan à cada passo otros infinitos Autores, hablando en terminos de Feudos, y de Beneficios Ecclesiasticos, y resolviendo, que ni Reyes, ni Papas, por mas ampla, que en ellos tengan su potestad, pueden privar à los posseedores sin citacion, y sentencia declaratoria, no interviniendo causa tan justa, y grave, que obligue à proceder ex abrupto." At §40 Tiberio Deciano is reported as holding this true to such a degree "que procede, y se ha de practicar aun en caso, que constasse notoriamente, que no les competia defensa alguna, ni podian alegar cosa, que le televasse, y aprovechasse" — that is, that the hearing is owed even when it is certain the party has nothing to say.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
The chapter's hardest question is introduced as one the author had seen doubted often and had seen fought out in an American case. At §41 "Y sin desviarnos mucho de esto, que vamos diciendo, podemos aora entrar en una question, de que he visto dudar muchas veces, y fue muy controvertida en la causa de un Encomendero del Cuzco: conviene à saber, si el Rey, ò el Virrey privassen à uno de su Encomienda, y se la diessen luego à otro, afirmando en su titulo, que el privado cometió delitos tales, que mereciò le fuesse quitada, y que de ello les ha constado bastantemente, tendrán obligacion los Jueces inferiores de estár por esta assercion, y de obedecer el mandato del Superior, que en ella se funda, dando sin mas réplica la possession de la Encomienda al nuevo nombrado?" The encomendero is not named on the page, no date, viceroy or outcome is given there, and none is supplied here: the case is reported as a much-controverted question, not as a decision.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
The answer given is a duty of disobedience, stated in terms that are not confined to encomiendas. At §42 "digo, que si al inferior le constasse con evidencia, que la assercion del Superior, en que fundó su mandato es siniestra, y por el consiguiente injusto, lo que se les manda executar, no solo puede; sino debe sobreseer en la execucion, hasta avisarle, de lo que passa, para que mejor informado provea, lo que convenga. Porque à los Principes nunca se les ha de obedecer en lo ilicito, ni ellos con toda la plenitud de su potestad pueden mandar, que se esté à sola su assercion en perjuicio de tercero." The stay is accompanied by a report back, not by a refusal: the inferior suspends and informs, so that the superior, better informed, may provide.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
The counterweight is printed on the same page and is much the larger of the two. At §43 "Pero si no constasse notoriamente de esta injusticia, todos están conformes, en que puede el Principe condenar, no solo en privacion de bienes, sino en penas corporales, à los que él infaliblemente, y con segura ciencia, y conciencia sabe, que han delinquido, sin substanciarles processo alguno para este efecto: y que los inferiores, à quienes se dirigen sus mandatos, tendrán obligacion à obedecerlos, y executarlos, aun quando se hallassen con alguna duda cerca de su justificacion: porque se debe presumir por ellos, y la necessidad de obedecer, que el Derecho les pone en tal caso, les libra de qualquier escrupulo, que puedan ellos tener en contrario." The protection of §42 is therefore against evident injustice only; doubt resolves in favour of obedience, and the prince may impose even corporal penalties without process on what he knows infallibly.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
Two authorities are cited for the wider proposition, and one of them is domestic. At §44 "Sobre lo qual es digna de leerse una ley de nuestras Partidas, que dice, como se han de haber en tales casos los meros Executores, y una decision de Antonio Thesauro donde prueba, que el Principe no tiene obligacion de guardar el orden judicial, principalmente el introducido por Derecho positivo." At §45 the same latitude is said to extend downwards: "aun los inferiores, à quien èl comete, que procedan en algun negocio, como les constare, ò pareciere, pueden tambien proceder, juzgar, y arbitrar segun su propia conciencia, y sin formar processo judicial, ò citar las partes, como singularmente lo enseñó Baldo, seguido comunmente por otros DD." Neither the ley de Partida nor the decision of Thesauro was opened here; they are known only as this book reports them.
confidence 0.85Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
A rule about pardons follows, and it protects the second grantee rather than the pardoned man. At §46 "si el Rey, ora ex abrupto, ora judicialmente, mandáre quitar à uno su Encomienda por causa de rebelion, y esta la diere luego à otro en remuneracion de servicios, aunque cesse despues la causa de rebelion, y mande el Rey, que le sean vueltos sus bienes al condenado: todavia, este perdon, ò indulgencia, no se debe estender à la Encomienda del tercero: porque, aunque aya cessado la causa del rebelion, no cessa la de los meritos, que ocasionaron la merced, que de ella se le hizo", as Filipo Corneo teaches and proves, followed by Ripa — "Aunque Hercules Marescoto lleva la contraria opinion, el qual se podrá vér, quando se ofreciere este caso." The contrary authority is named on the page and is carried here rather than dropped.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
The chapter closes on a question of reckoning that decided how long a restored grant had left to run. At §47 "Y aora por remate de este Capitulo, tocaré otro, que es mas grave, y dudoso: conviene à saber, si quitada una vez la Encomienda por la causa dicha, ò por otras, que induzcan legitima privacion, el Principe, usando de clemencia, y benignidad, se la volviere à dar al delinquente, y perdonandole culpas, y penas, será visto darsela como nueva, ò restituirle la antigua en el mismo estado, y vidas, en que la tenia, y gozaba?" Because an encomienda ran for two lives, the answer determined whether the restored holder resumed a term already partly spent or began a fresh one.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
The answer is made to turn on the wording of the grant, and the rule of construction favours restitution over novelty. At §48 "aunque los DD. andan muy varios, mi parecer es, que todo pende de la voluntad del Principe, y de las palabras, con que la explica: porque si usa de algunas, que denoten restitucion, aunque añada otras, en que diga, que concede de nuevo, se entenderá, que solo le quiso volver lo quitado, y en la forma, y estado, que lo tenia, porque essa es la naturaleza de restitucion", as Rosenthal and the Regente Ponte resolve in the terms of feudos. At §49, if he used no such words and had already incorporated the lost encomienda in himself and after some interval grants it again to the man who had held it, "podremos creer, y decir, que se la quiso dar, y diò como nueva, y assi desde entonces se le comenzarán à correr las dos vidas", per a celebrated gloss commonly followed, which reconciles the conflicting opinions by that distinction and supports it with the examples of the peculium and of the ship rebuilt after being taken apart without that intention.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
In doubt the chapter decides against the grantee, and the reason given names a third interest that the rest of the chapter mostly ignores. At §50 "Pero en caso de duda, avrémos de entender, que esta Encomienda se quiso dar, ò restituir como estaba, para que assi perjudique menos al concedente, y à los que acabado el tiempo, porque corria, pudiessen tener derecho de ser remunerados, y acomodados en ella" — that is, in favour of the crown and of the other claimants waiting for the grant to fall in — "Aunque para otros efectos, lo mas cierto, y comun suele ser, que el Feudo no se presuma antiguo, sino nuevo, como lo enseñan bien Alciato, Menochio, y Craveta."
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
The chapter's last paragraph states a general rule about restitution of confiscated property, and it is stated for subjects at large rather than for encomenderos. At §51 "Y tambien es comun conclusion, que en qualquier restitucion de bienes confiscados, que el Principe hace à sus Subditos, siempre se entienden repetidas todas las calidades, que antes tenian, aunque no lo expresse en su gracia: de manera, que los que eran feudales, quedáran por feudales, y los de Mayorazgo por Mayorazgo, y los que eran Titulados con el honor, y preeminencia del Titulo", following the doctrine of certain glosses, as many authors ancient and modern resolve, among them Mastrillo, who reproves the Regente Ponte for holding the contrary as to the title and says how what he writes is to be understood. Capítulo XXX, on the suits and dispossessions of encomiendas, begins immediately after it.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary
What this entry establishes and what it does not. It establishes that the standard treatise on the government of the Spanish Indies laid down that an encomienda could not be taken from its holder on an imputation, that the fault had to be proved first and legitimately, and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants could deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms; that the same was asserted against popes as well as kings, and extended by Deciano even to the party who had no defence to offer; that a question much doubted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco was answered by requiring an inferior judge to stay execution of an order whose premise was evidently sinister and to inform the superior, while requiring obedience wherever the injustice was not notorious; and that the reckoning of a restored grant's remaining lives was made to depend on the words of the restoring decree, with doubt resolved in favour of the crown and of other claimants. It establishes nothing about practice: no encomendero is named, no order is dated, no outcome of the Cuzco cause is given on these pages, and this entry does not supply any. It establishes nothing about the Indians of these encomiendas, who are not parties to any of these questions on these pages; the due process described is owed to the grantee, and the same book's earlier chapters, where the encomendero is the defendant and the Indians the complainants, are where that other side of the institution sits. And the counterweight at §43 is as much part of the doctrine as the protection at §42: the same author who says princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit says on the next line that a prince may condemn without any process at all on what he knows infallibly, and that inferiors in doubt must execute.
confidence 0.9Política Indiana, libro III, capítulo XXIX, §§38-51 — what had to be proved before an encomienda could be taken away, whether an inferior judge must obey a superior who asserts that the delict is established, and whether a restored encomienda is the old one or a new grant: the rule that the fault must be proved first and that neither the prince nor his viceroys and lieutenants may deprive or regrant without citation, hearing, conviction and condemnation by judicial terms, with Rebuffo that donations made otherwise are of no moment even from supreme kings; the doctrine that neither kings nor popes may deprive possessors without citation and declaratory sentence unless a cause so just and grave obliges them to proceed ex abrupto; Tiberio Deciano's extension of it to the case where no defence is available; the question much controverted in the cause of an encomendero of Cuzco; the answer that an inferior to whom the superior's assertion is evidently sinister not only may but must stay execution and inform him, because princes are never to be obeyed in the illicit and cannot with all the plenitude of their power command that their bare assertion stand to the prejudice of a third party; the contrary rule where the injustice is not notorious; the Partidas law on mere executors and Antonio Thesauro on the prince's freedom from the judicial order; the rebel's pardon that does not reach the third party's encomienda; and the distinction by which restitution restores the old grant while a regrant after an interval starts the two lives afresh · primary